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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RORY J. ATCITTY, by and
through his parent Roger
Atcitty, Sr.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 980096-CA

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
SAN JUAN COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT, LYMAN GROVER,
Priority No. 15
Defendants and Appellees.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
DEFENDANTS A SUMMARY JUDGMENT
a. Notice And The Opportunity To Be Heard.
Rory Atcittyxs

("Rory") suspension

from

school required

enhanced due process protection under the unusual circumstances of
this case. Appellants Brief, Page 31-37. Yet he was not afforded
the most basic requirements: adequate notice and a proper and
timely opportunity to be heard.

The District's myopic and fact-

selective position is contrary to the standards of appellate
review. On appeal, Rory is entitled to a much broader view of what
transpired when he was suspended from school. He is entitled to do
so because this Court views the facts and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing

1

the motion. E.g., Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 233
(Utah 1993); see also Interlake Distributors, Inc. v. Old Mill
Towne, 339 Utah. Adv. Rep. 7, 8 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting Kitchen
v. California Gas Co.. 821 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah App. 1991)).
Here, the principal of Whitehorse High School ("Mr. Grover")
received information that students had used marijuana during a band
trip to Colorado. Lyman Grover Deposition. R. 940, at Pages 10, 12.
Mr. Grover began an investigation which spanned the week of May 1316, 1996 and resulting in Rory's suspension. Jd. at Pages 36-37.
On May 13, 1996, Mr. Grover called Rory's father and invited
him to the school rather than talking with Rory. Lyman Grover
Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 12-13. Mr. Grover spoke with Rory's
father ("Mr. Atcitty") and provided him a cursory explanation of
the allegations. Ld., at Pages 14-15.

Mr. Atcitty attempted to

informally resolve the matter, but was rebuffed by the principal
who, despite not being in full possession of the facts, took a
hard-line attitude that there would be no deals or accommodations.
Id., at Page 17. Mr. Atcitty responded by stating that he did not
want his son interrogated unless he was present.

Id. at Pages 23-

25. Mr. Atcitty also asked for a hearing and an explanation of the
process involved. Roger Atcitty, Sr. Deposition, R. 939, at Pages
24, 26.

Mr. Grover, however, states it was his policy to not

explain suspension procedures until he had decided what action to
take. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Page 28.

Thus, Mr.

Grover failed to advise Mr. Atcitty where and when Rory would be
given an opportunity to present his side of the story, Roger
2

Atcitty, Sr. Deposition. at Pages 18-19, and that he intended to
speak with Rory without Mr. Atcitty being present.1 Lyman Grover
Deposition. R. 940, at Pages 20, 23.

Mr. Grover did tell Mr.

Atcitty that under some circumstances Rory would have the right to
confront his accusers. Id., at Pages 17-18.

He also refused to

provide Mr. Atcitty with the names of some of his informants. JEd.
at Page 16.
On May 14, Mr. Grover approached Rory when Mr. Atcitty was not
present2 with the purpose of interrogating him about the alleged
incident. Lyman Grover Deposition. R. 940, at Pages 23-27; Rory
Atcitty Deposition. R. 941, at Pages 29-34.

In response to the

Principal's request that Rory write out a statement as to what
happened, Rory refused. Lyman Grover Deposition. R. 940, at Pages
24-25.

During this encounter Mr. Grover did not tell Rory he was

suspended, nor was he informed about suspension procedures. Rory
Atcitty Deposition, R. 941, at Page 28. Rory was not warned by the
principal of the consequences of not discussing the matter or that
this was his only chance to tell his side of the story. Id. Rory
1

Appellees misstate the facts by stating Rory had an
opportunity to be heard on May 13. Appellees' Brief. Pages 20-21.
In fact, Mr. Grover had not finished his investigation and was not
in full possession of the facts. At that point, he elected only to
talk to Rory's father. Lyman Grover Deposition. R. 940, Pages 1415. Rory was not present when Mr. Grover and Mr. Atcitty talked.
Id. Furthermore, no arrangements were made (on May 13) to speak to
Rory when his father was at the school. Jd. at 14-22.
2

Again, defendants misstate the facts by saying, Appellees'
Brief. Pages 11-13, that both Rory and his father were present. In
fact, Rory was alone with Mr. Grover and an assistant principal.
Lvman Grover Deposition. Page 24. Mr. Grover later equivocated,
saying that he does not remember whether he talked with Mr. Atcitty
at any time that day. Jd. at Pages 26-27.
3

was never provided with the facts which formed the basis for the
allegations. Id. at 24-37.
Later that same day (May 14)f Mr. Atcitty went to the school
in response to a call from Rory.

Mr. Atcitty talked with the

principal, and again told Mr. Grover that his son was not to be
interrogated unless he was present. Roger Atcitty. Sr. Deposition,
R. 939, Pages 9, 7-8.

Again, Mr. Grover failed to explain the

disciplinary process to Mr. Atcitty, Lyman Grover Deposition!, R.
940, at Page 28, despite Mr. Atcitty's having again asked for this
information. Roger Atcitty, Sr. Deposition, R. 939, at page 24.
Mr. Grover testified that at that point he had not decided what
action to take other than to continue his investigation.
Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 9-10, 28.

Lyman

Mr. Atcitty left

this encounter with the principal at "a total loss" as to what was
going to happen next. Roger Atcitty Deposition, R. 939, at Page 8.
Although Mr. Grover was aware that Rory would not speak without his
father being present, the principal did not warn Mr. Atcitty that
Rory had missed his only opportunity to be heard, or enlist his
support in getting Rory to provide a written statement. Lyman
Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 22-28.
A reasonable inference can be made from the circumstances of
the encounters of May 13 and 14, that both Rory and his father had
a reasonable expectation that Rory would be given a meaningful
opportunity at a later time to tell his side of the story. This
inference is reasonable because Mr. Grover had not made a decision.
Moreover,

any

ambiguity

with

respect
4

to

the

process

was

a

deliberate action by Mr. Grover.

Although Mr. Grover professed

that his policy was to explain suspension procedures only at the
time a decision was made, he did not explain due process procedures
at the time he suspended Rory.

Mr. Grover had told Rory and his

father that under some circumstances Rory would be entitled to
confront his accusers.

At the same time, he did not explain the

circumstances and he withheld the names of some of his informants.
Rory and his father were entitled to conclude that they would be
given this and other critical information when a decision was made
and when Rory would be heard while confronting his accusers.
A reasonable inference can be made based on the May 13 and 14
encounters that Rory understood this stage of the process to be
fact-finding because the principal only wanted Rory (as well as the
other students) to write a statement.
A reasonable inference can be made based on the May 13 and 14
encounters that Rory understood that the principal was not holding
a hearing because Rory was not told it was an adjudicatory meeting,
given the fact that no decision had been made and no punishment had
been imposed.
It was reasonable that Rory would not speak to the principal
alone because he knew that the principal had been told by his
father, without Mr. Grover saying anything to the contrary, that
speaking with Rory would only be done with the father present.
It was reasonable that Rory would expect that the principal
would fully involve Rory's father because instead of talking with
Rory directly on May 13 Mr. Grover called Mr. Atcitty and invited
5

him to the school.
It is a reasonable inference that Rory would speak when a
decision was made on when/where a hearing would be held where he
would be informed of the allegations and the basis of the charges.
It is a reasonable inference that Rory would not give Mr.
Grover a written statement because his father had told him that he
wanted to be present since the statement was intended for police,
not school purposes.3
It is also reasonable to infer that Mr. Grover was aware of
the circumstances and understood why Rory would be reluctant to
give a written statement.
It is reasonable that given Mr. Grover's awareness of the
circumstances he would correct any impressions that he felt were
mistaken on Rory's part.
It is a reasonable inference that Rory and his father would
have spoken out and given Rory/s side of the story if, at any time,
the principal had warned them that failure to respond to Mr.
Grover's questions or make a written statement would waive Rory's

3

The principal considered the situation a police matter from
the outset. Lyman Grover Deposition. R. 940, at Pages 30-31.
Although the other students had verbally acknowledged complicity in
the incident, Mr. Grover went further and required written
statements that he eventually gave to the police. Mr. Atcitty
understood the implications of the situation when he met with Mr.
Grover the day before. Roger Atcitty Deposition. R. 939, at Pages
7-9. Mr. Grover needed Rory's written statement to add to the
others he was planning to give to police.
If he were only
interested in getting Rory's side of the story, Mr. Grover would
have engaged in a dialogue rather than demanding a written
confession. Verbal statements are sufficient for school purposes,
Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 581-584 (1975), but written
statements are far more valuable to the police.
6

only opportunity to be heard.
On May 16f 1996, Mr. Grover decided to suspend Rory and other
students, Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Page 29, and to call
the police. Id., at Pages 30-31, 36-39f 53-54.

A police officer

arrived at the school and was provided with students' statements
and other reports by Mr. Grover. Id. at Pages 37, 53-54.

Mr.

Grover then summoned the students to his office and announced his
decision to suspend them in the police officer's presence. Id. at
Pages 36-37.

Immediately following the suspension, the officer

questioned and arrested the students. Id. at Pages 36-39.

At no

time was Rory advised that this was his chance to tell his side of
the story, despite its apparent unfairness. Id. Nor was Rory told
about suspension procedures. Id. Although Rory said nothing to the
principal, he did make a denial to the police officer. Lyman Grover
Affidavit, R. 513, 516, 1 9.
The facts and reasonable inferences drawn from them are that
the May 16 confrontation involving Rory and the police officer is
that the principal's suspension announcement was nothing more than
a fait

accompli

and that Mr. Grover's only motive for the meeting

was to do nothing other than inform the students of the suspension
before allowing the police officer to interrogate and arrest them.
A reasonable inference can be made from the totality of the
circumstances of the three encounters between the principal, Rory
and Mr. Atcitty is that Rory was denied adequate notice of his
right to be heard in a meaningful manner.
A reasonable inference can be made from the totality of the
7

circumstances of the three encounters involving the principal, Rory
and Mr, Atcitty that Rory was denied an opportunity to be heard at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
The reasonable inferences arising from the facts were not
discussed or even acknowledged in the trial court's opinion. See
Ruling On Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, R. 8486; Ruling On Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, R. 804-806.
The point of such cases as Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)
and Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) is that due process
must

be

applied

in

a

flexible

manner

circumstances of each particular case.

and

tailored

to the

Matthews uses a balancing

test in order to apply due process to the facts of a particular
case. Appellant's Brief, Pages 31-37.

The District wants this

Court to refuse to follow Matthews. Appellees7 Brief, Pages 34-35.
This rigid and narrow view is contrary to due process principles.
Indeed, courts have held that due process standards preclude "any
concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every
imaginable situation." Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961); see also Roach v. University of Utah, 968 F.Supp. 1446,
1451 (D.Utah 1997).

Yetf in cases of student discipline, the

District would have it that due process is satisfied every time a
student has any conceivable chance to talk no matter what the
situation may be. This is incredulous given Mr. Grover's absolute
failure to explain anything to Rory or his father.

Under the

District's theory, the circumstances and background of the matter
would have little bearing or significance.
8

But the circumstances surrounding Rory's encounters with the
principal do matter, especially since the right to notice is so
intertwined with the right to be heard. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 579.

Without proper notice, the opportunity to be

heard is meaningless. The principal never explained the suspension
process to Rory.4

Of critical importance is Mr. Grover's failure

to warn Rory that he was being disciplined, that encounters between
himself and Rory were actually hearings instead of mere inquiries,
and that these encounters would be his only opportunity to be
heard.

Rory never knew that his right to stay in school was in

jeopardy.

Providing proper information should have been done

before action was taken. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582, 584;
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542
(1985); see also Worrall v. Qgden City Fire Dept., 616 P.2d 598,
601-602 (Utah 1980) (due process requires notice that a particular
time

is appropriate

to be properly

heard).

At

the least,

information about what to do and when to do it should have been
given at a time sufficient to enable Rory to react appropriately.
It is one of the most disturbing anomalies of Rory/s treatment
that Mr. Grover implicitly acknowledged his obligation to explain
4

The District responds to Rory's claim that the disciplinary
policies are vague and ambiguous by saying that this is a separate
issue. This shows no understanding of how the vague policies
skewed the notice which was required to be given to Rory. The
District's rules do not identify the process to be used in shortterm suspensions. A student and his or her parents are left to
guess about when is the appropriate time for a student to be heard.
The principal, as the only source of information and the only
official in authority dealing with the student and parents, must
therefore explain this procedure, something Mr. Grover did not do
with Rory.
9

the due process procedure when he testified that his policy was to
provide that information at the time he makes a decision, Lyman
Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Page 28, then failed to do so at the
time he suspended Rory and the other students, Id. at pages 36-37,
or any other time, this despite Mr. Atcitty's having made a
specific request for it. Roger Atcitty Deposition, R. 939, at Page
24.

Mr. Grover was cryptic at best, and deceptive at worst, in

communicating his intentions. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co. , 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950), the Court said that for notice
to satisfy the Due Process Clause the "means employed must be such
as one desirous of actually
adopt..."

informing the absentee might reasonably

(emphasis added).

One actually desiring to provide

information to an unsophisticated child, or a student who at times
was absent but being represented by his parent, would, at the very
least, speak clearly and in specific terms. Yet, Mr. Grover would
not do this. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (required notice
must be "effective").

It is not surprising that neither Rory nor

his father understood what they should do or what the principal
intended to do.
The clear implications of Mr. Grover's misleading both Rory
and his father and in seeking only a written statement without
engaging in meaningful dialogue with Rory is that the principal was
not interested in the informal give and take between student and
disciplinarian required by Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584.
Not only was Rory denied proper notice, he was denied the
right to be heard in a meaningful manner.
10

While notice is a

compelling aspect of Rory's due process claim, see Appellants'
Brief, Pages 16-20, the District says nothing in its response about
this critical issue other than to claim that Rory and his father
were given general information about the allegations during the
week's encounters and that this was all the school district had to
do.

The defendants miss the point entirely because the real

question is whether Rory was told what was happening to him, fully
informed about what the principal was trying to do, and advised
about what he should do.

It is this information, and only this

information, that can guide Rory through the process and ensure
that he or his parents take the proper measures, make the right
decisions, and speak out at the appropriate time. Mr. Grover could
have and should have taken the time to provide this information,
particularly since Mr. Atcitty requested it early on while asking
for a hearing. See Roger Atcitty, Sr. Deposition, R. 939, at Pages
24, 26.
The May 13 meeting between Mr. Atcitty and the principal was
not a meaningful opportunity to be heard because Rory was not
present, not withstanding the District's assertion to the contrary.
See Fn. 1, supra.

Mr. Grover did not have all the facts and did

not provide Mr. Atcitty with what information he did know.

Most

importantly, the principal did not tell Mr. Atcitty what the
disciplinary process was or warn him or Rory how to conduct
themselves despite Mr. Atcitty's having repeatedly requested this
information.
The May 14 encounter between Rory and Mr. Grover cannot be

11

called a meaningful due process hearing because the principal was
only focused on collecting written statements from students.

He

wanted a written statement from Rory to add to the statements of
the other students that he was planning to give to the police. He
made no accusations, did not suspend or discipline Rory, and, most
telling, did not warn Rory that this encounter was really the
hearing that would be his only chance to be heard. Rory's silence
in the face of this approach is understandable because he had a
reasonable expectation that he would be heard at a later time when
his father would be present.

It was also reasonable for him to

assume that this conversation was only meant to elicit facts and
was not a hearing.

Mr. Grover did nothing to dispel these

impressions either when talking with Rory or when Mr. Atcitty
requested that he be present when the child was interrogated.

It

is reasonable to infer that Mr. Grover knew that he had created the
wrong impressions and deliberately did nothing to correct the
situation.5 See Appellants' Brief, Pages 20-22.
It would have been easy and no burden imposed on either the
principal or the school district to balance the District's right to
effectively administer discipline in its schools with Rory's right
to a public education and to being treated fairly by school
5

Rory knew that Mr. Grover had first contacted the father
rather than going to Rory on May 13. Rory knew that Mr. Grover
again spoke to Mr. Atcitty on May 14. Mr. Grover knew that Rory
had a reasonable assumption (one the principal did not dispel) that
when it came time to discuss matters with the principal that Rory's
father would be involved. Mr. Grover also knew that Mr. Atcitty
was laboring under the impression that an investigation was going
on, that it was continuing in nature, and that when completed the
principal would allow Rory to state his side of story.
12

officials.

Mr.

Grover

need

only

have

clearly

stated

his

intentions, told Rory what the evidence was, described the process
involved, told Rory that he was being disciplined, and that this
would be the proper and only time for Rory to speak out and give
his side of the story.

Mr. Grover failed to take these basic

steps.6
The District does not claim that Rory incorrectly states the
facts apparent from the record other than to say, erroneously, that
Rory does not address what happened but rather focuses on what
should have happened. Appellees/ Brief, at Page 9. Significantly,
the District does not dispute the reasonable inferences that Rory
draws from the testimony.

Rather, the District simply takes the

narrow view that Rory could have given his side of the story on
more than one occasion but did not do so until it was too late.
However, taking this tact ignores the factual record and distorts
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the occasions on
which Rory, Mr. Grover and Mr. Atcitty talked.

It also clashes

with the fundamentals of due process regarding notice and the
opportunity to be fairly heard.

The District does not provide a

satisfactory explanation for these questions, choosing instead to
concentrate on collateral issues such as whether enhanced due

6

Although Rory's due process claim can be decided on this
basis alone, this Court may move on to consider whether a more
enhanced due process procedure was required under the unusual
circumstances of this case. Rory faced serious charges with the
possible loss of honor-student status and suspension from school.
The principal's involvement with the police in gathering evidence
which culminated in Rory's arrest also militates in favor of
enhanced protection. See Appellant's Brief, Pages 28-37.
13

process is due,7 or whether Rory was entitled to amend his
complaint.8 Even if this Court rules against Rory on these claims,
the fundamental question of notice and the right to be properly
heard still squarely falls on Rory's side of the due process
equation.

The trial court's summary judgment was, therefore,

clearly inappropriate.9
b. MITIGATION OF PUNISHMENT AND DUE PROCESS.
The trial court's reasoning that the District complied with
due process in all respects is particularly suspect regarding the
denial of Rory's right to be heard in mitigation of punishment.
This basic right to ameliorate the punishment and ensure that
discipline follows school policy is an important component of due
process. Appellants' Brief, Pages 39-42; 25-27.

The issue was

raised in plaintiff's initial complaint. Plaintiff's Complaint, R.
3,19.

Mr. Grover should have given Rory an opportunity to decide

what punishment to accept10 and an opportunity to require that the
7

Compare Appellant's Brief, Pages 31-37 with Appellees'
Brief, Pages 22-38.
8

Although the District's response focuses on whether the
amendment raises new claims, plaintiff's were entitled to amend for
other reasons, including refining the remedies that Rory was
entitled to receive from the trial court, see U.S. v. Hougham, 364
U.S. 310 (1960) , and to modify previously alleged claims. Young v.
Seabord Corp., 360 F.Supp. 490, 497 (D. Utah 1973).
9

Indeed, the facts and reasonable inferences from the facts
taken in a light most favorable to Rory indicate that the trial
court should have entered summary judgment in his favor. See Brief
Of Appellant, Pages 13-37.
10

Part of the suspension-hearing process is the provision of
home-schooling services to the student. These are required by the
District's disciplinary procedures, e.g., School District Policy
No. 7335(3), R. 238; School District Policy No. FF(3), R. 252;
14

discipline comport with district policy.
Mr. Grover did not explain alternative punishments to Rory,
with the result that Rory was deprived of important home-schooling
services at the end of the school year for six of the ten days that
he was suspended. Roger Atcitty Sr. Deposition. R. 939, at Pages
13-18; see also Lyman Grover Deposition. R. 940, at Pages 35-37.12
Since the trial court erred in finding that defendants complied
with due process on this issue, a summary judgment approving, in
all respects, the manner in which Rory's suspension from school was
conducted is inappropriate.

And finally, another matter which

should be of concern to this Court is that the trial court's
decision regarding mitigation of punishment clashes with the trial
School District Policy No. F G A B ( A H l H a ) , R. 255, and Utah state
law, Utah Code Ann. §§ 53A-11-906-907. The student may elect to
fulfill the ten-day suspension obligation by either entering an
alcohol rehabilitation program or by receiving home-schooling
services. San Juan School District Policy No. FGABfAWl)a-b, R.
255. Rory elected to receive home-schooling.
11

See Appellants' Brief, Page 25. The District misconstrues
Rory's claim, believing that Rory wanted a separate hearing on this
question.
Rather, Rory's complaint is that he was given no
opportunity at all to mitigate punishment. See Lamb v. Panhandle
Community Unit School Dist. No. 2, 826 F.2d 526, 528-529 (7th Cir.
1987.
The District's distinguishes Lamb by saying it was an
expulsion, not a suspension case.
But Lamb should not be so
narrowly construed.
Mitigation of punishment is part of due
process. See Strickland v. Inlow, 519 F.2d 744, 746-747 (7th Cir.
1975). The District also says that Rory had three opportunities to
mitigate punishment. This contention is belied by the fact that no
decision had been made and no punishment imposed on two of the
occasions that Rory or his father talked to the principal and on
the third occasion where Rory was being arrested, hardly a
meaningful opportunity to discuss anything much less a school
policy that had never been explained to him.
12

This occurred despite the District's being placed on notice
of Rory's mitigation claim when the lawsuit and a request for a
restraining order were filed following the suspension.
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court's finding that there are disputed factual issues.

R. 815-

816; see also R. 867-869; 880-896. If this Court finds there to be
disputed

facts, see Appellants' Brief, Pages 39-42, Rory is

entitled to a reversal of the judgment and a trial on this
question.
CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the judgment and order of the trial
court.

The Court should order the trial court to enter a partial

judgment for Rory on his claim that he was suspended from school
without due process, reserving the question of remedy for trial.
In the alternative, this Court should remand the case for trial
proceedings based on his amended complaint.
Dated this 14th day of May, 1998.
Eric P. Swenson
Rosalie Reilly
Attorneys for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Eric P. Swenson, attorney for Appellant, hereby certifies that
he will personally deliver two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Reply Brief to the attorneys for Appellees at the law
offices of Anderson and Anderson, L. Robert Anderson and Daniel G.
Anderson, Monticello, Utah, on the 18th day of May, 1998.
Dated this 14th day of May, 19J
Eric P. Swenson
Attorney for Appellant
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